1. The basis for the subjective environmental right in the GPECA
The framework of international and EU law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) does not feature a subjective environmental right and does not emphasise the importance of a supportive environment for enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the declaration. The environmental aspects of human rights are also not refl ected in other classical human rights instruments. At the time of their codifi cation, knowledge of environmental problems was limited and other issues were at the centre of concern. For instance, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) was adopted as a response to the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and the rise of communism. *2 Awareness of environmental issues rapidly increased in the decades following the Second World War. This led to the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration (1972), whose fi rst principle stipulates: 'Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that unconditional and suffi ciently precise environmental protection requirements, especially the nature protection provisions. However, it seems unlikely that the criterion of 'being concerned' would be interpreted restrictively by the Court. *13 The direct applicability of certain environmental quality requirements set forth in the directives does not mean that the Court has recognised a subjective material environmental right. The aim behind the doctrine of direct eff ect of directives is to ensure legal integration and eff ectiveness of EU law, which also underpinned the Court's original articulation of the direct eff ect of treaty provisions. However, EU law would certainly play an important role in any national attempt to defi ne a material environmental right, by setting out the minimum requirements for many aspects of environmental quality.
Constitutional provisions for the environment
Unlike the majority of modern constitutions in this respect *14 , the Constitution of the Estonian Republic *15 does not explicitly recognise a subjective right to environment. Section 5 sets out that the natural wealth and resources of Estonia are national riches that must be used sustainably. This is a general provision that underscores the value of the environment and is considered to form the basis for a duty of the state to protect the environment. *16 The fi rst sentence of §53 stipulates that everyone has a duty to preserve the human and natural environment and to compensate for harm that he or she has caused to the environment. Whilst this is a provision for a fundamental duty, its ambiguous wording casts doubt on whether it has any direct eff ect. *17 The lack of explicit reference to an environmental right does not mean that the drafters of the Constitution were not concerned about environmental impacts on human life. In the fi nal year of existence of the Soviet Union (1991), the Constitutional Assembly (also 'the Assembly' below) was formed and tasked with drafting of the Constitution. *18 An environmental right was debated on several occasions during the discussions by the Assembly *19 , and the fi rst 'fi nal' draft that was made public, in late 1991, explicitly recognised the right to a healthy environment. *20 That right was later edited out. The reasons for this decision are not clear, because the minutes of the meetings are incomplete. In the earlier discussions, some drafters voiced a concern that the right was too ambiguous. *21 The decision may also have been infl uenced by somewhat naïve thinking (in retrospect) that the emphasis must instead be on the fundamental environmental duty, because after privatisation of industry the state no longer has an important role in controlling environmental pollution. *22 Although the reference to a healthy environment was deleted, the right to health protection was retained in the Constitution as adopted: the fi rst sentence of §28 states that everyone is entitled to protection of his or her health.
The Århus Convention, which Estonia ratifi ed in 2001, had a signifi cant impact on Estonian legal thinking about environmental rights, including the basic environmental right. Some authors proposed that the The court is clearly in favour of enabling the public to play an active role in environmental protection in disputes with Member States, as can be seen from the decisions on interpretation of provisions of directives that implement access to justice requirements of the Århus Convention. basic right can be derived from the Constitution even in the absence of express reference to such a right. According to one of the more articulate opinions, the duty set out in §53 of the Constitution includes the state and, also, a state duty that serves individuals' interests and is formulated in the chapter on basic rights has to give rise to a subjective right. *23 I too am of the opinion that it is possible to derive the right from the state duty and that recognising that right would be in the spirit of the Constitution. The enforceability of the right would probably be limited in consequence of its indeterminate nature; nonetheless, recognition of the basic right would have important symbolic value and it would infl uence the interpretation of provisions of ordinary laws, especially procedural requirements. *24 However, there is no general agreement as to the existence or the exact constitutional basis of the right. *25 The lack of explicit reference to an environmental right in the Constitution did not deter some administrative courts from recognising that right in order to allow standing before the court. According to §15 of the Constitution and §44 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure *26 , the right of action is based on the protection of subjective rights. Violation of subjective rights is understood in light of the protective norm theory. According to that theory, a violation of a provision of public law results in violation of a person's subjective right only when the violated provision protects the person's interest. In the decision on whether a person has a subjective right, both the aim with the violated norm and the weight of the person's interest must be considered. *27 In legal practice, it would have been diffi cult for the complainant to demonstrate a violation of a traditional subjective right, such as a right to ownership. Therefore, some courts, especially the Tallinn Circuit Court, took the position that standing can stem directly from a violation of the basic environmental right. *28 The Tallinn Circuit Court has held that, on account of §5 of the Constitution, 'there is no real reason to doubt that the Constitution imposes a duty to protect the environment on the state and on the agencies of a local municipality. The duty not just is objective but creates a subjective right to demand from the public authority the preservation of the environment at least in the event that it aff ects one's living environment'. The Court reasoned that it is evident from the Constitution that the state duty is imposed for the benefi t of every inhabitant of Estonia. Also, §10 of the Constitution encourages recognition of new rights, *29 especially if those rights are generally accepted in the European region, such as the right referred to in Article 1 of the Århus Convention. It should be noted also that the right is recognised in many other national constitutions and that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights requires a high level of environmental protection. *30 The subjective basi c right was not recognised by all courts. *31 It is important to note that the Supreme Court neither acknowledged nor denied the existence of the right for a long time. Instead, the Supreme Court extended standing in connection with environmental matters in 2007 by allowing fi ling of complaints not only on the basis of a violation of a subjective right but also on the basis of being directly concernedi.e., on the basis of certain interests. *32 The legal basis for the exceptional standing and its extent were not Section of the Constitution stipulates: 'The rights, freedoms and duties set out in the chapter of basic rights and obligations do not preclude other rights, freedoms and duties which arise from the spirit of the Constitution or are in accordance therewith, and which are in conformity with the principles of human dignity, social justice and democratic government founded on the rule of law.' Tallinn CCd . . , --, paras -.
See, e.g., the overview of the relevant practice of administrative courts until off ered by K. Vaarmari. Keskkonnaalane subjektiivne õigus Eesti kohtupraktikas ['The subjective environmental right in Estonian court practice']. -Juridica (VII).
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, ----, para. . clear, although the Court explicitly denied actio popularis. *33 However, in 2010 the Supreme Court fi nally tackled the question of the existence of a basic environmental right. The Court held that the environment is an important value for everyone but that an enforceable independent subjective environmental right cannot be derived directly from § § 5 and 55. In the Court's opinion, a right to a clean environment can emerge as an independent subjective right if the criteria for such an environment and everyone's obligation to tolerate environmental impacts can be fi xed in the law. Currently the legal criteria are manifestly inadequate for determining the extent to which the right can be protected. *34
1.3. The relationship of the GPECA's §23 with the legal framework and court practice Estonian environmental law has been in the process of codifi cation since 2007. The process involves not just the consolidation and systematisation of existing law but also a critical review of the law, tackling of contradictions, and bridging of gaps; in other words, the codifi cation is substantive. *35 The General Part of the Environmental Code was adopted in 2011; however, the special part of the code has not been completed yet. *36 The subjective right to environment is set out in the GPECA's §23. The link with the Århus Convention is obvious from the wording of the name of the right -referring to a right to an environment that meets health and well-being needs -which is almost identical to the formulation of the right in the Estonian translation of the convention. However, according to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft GPECA, the intention was to set out a material right *37 rather than provide only procedural guarantees.
The explanatory memorandum states that the aim in stipulating the GPECA's §23 is to specify the basic right that has been recognised in court practice. *38 This statement may appear puzzling since the Supreme Court had rejected the right in 2010. The apparent contradiction can be explained through examination of the timeline of codifi cation. Initially the code was intended to be adopted as a unifi ed entity; however, because of the approaching 2011 general elections, consultations on the draft GPECA began on 13 May 2010. *39 The Supreme Court delivered the judgement in June after the consultation process. Parliamentary proceedings were initiated on 13 September 2010. *40 The Parliament was aware of the decision; however, it did not alter the wording of §23. It should be noted that the Parliament too was under time pressure because of the impending elections. The GPECA was adopted on 28 February 2011, and the general election was held in March.
2. Elements of the subjective environment right in the GPECA
The concept of environment
The GPECA's §23 entitles everyone to a certain environment but does not defi ne the concept of 'environment'. No universal legal defi nition of this concept exists; the elements of conventional defi nitions depend on the aims of the legislator. *41 In the broadest sense, the term signifi es surroundings, including social Ibid. Note that the practice was discontinued in on account of the entry into force of the GPECA's § . See ALCSCr . .
, ----, paras -.
ALCSCr . . , ----, para. .
See the explanatory memorandum to the GPECA, p. . Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems&ems help=true&eid= &u= (most recently accessed on . . ) (in Estonian).
At the time of writing of this article, in March , the majority of the codifi ed specifi c laws, such as the Water Act, are still in the draft stage. The deadline for the completion of the Special Part has been postponed several times.
See the memorandum referred to in Note , p. . and psychological elements. The focus of the GPECA is not so broad, which is evident from several of the act's provisions, especially the defi nitions of 'environmental information' and 'environmental organisation'. The defi nitions indicate that the term 'environment' has to be interpreted broadly but is limited to physical phenomena. The term undoubtedly encompasses natural environment, such as forests or ambient air. More controversial, in contrast, is the extent to which it covers the built environment. According to the explanatory memorandum, the term should be taken to encompass the elements of human-created environment that are similar to the natural environment, such as city parks *42 but the extent of the right should be clarifi ed in the process of codifi cation of building and planning law. Codifi cation of these areas of law was completed in 2015 *43 , but, regrettably, this has not resulted in any signifi cant clarifi cation of the scope of the GPECA's §23. *44
The concept of health and well-being needs
The GPECA's §23 is titled 'Right to environment that meets health and well-being needs'. These needs are not defi ned in the GPECA. The concept is vaguely outlined in the explanatory memorandum, which emphasises that the Parliament ought to discuss its limits. *45 It appears that no such discussion took place. In any case, the wording of the provision was not altered. The question of which needs are worthy of protection is not easy to answer. Inter alia, this can be seen in the discontinued practice of the Supreme Court by which standing was allowed on the basis of certain interest. The last relevant case pertained to the potential impacts of extracting sand from the seabed. The person who brought the action lived about two kilometres from the planned extraction site and was a fi sherman. The court panel was divided on the question of whether an important interest was at stake for this person. *46 In this context it may be useful to consider which kinds of environmental interests are protected by environmental law in general. Brennan van Dyke has divided such interests into three categories: 1) the right to inviolable integrity of the person, including the person's physical being and the person's property; 2) aesthetic sensibilities and recreation interests of humans; and 3) the interests of future generations and well-being of non-human life. *47 If only the fi rst category is included, what the GPECA's §23 provides for would resemble a traditional basic right. The problem is that it would be diffi cult to distinguish this from other traditional rights, such as the right to life, health, property, or one's home. If, on the other hand, all three categories are included, then the right would encompass some interests that clearly are not subjective interests of the person. Therefore, I suggest that an independent subjective right should cover the fi rst two categories of interests but not the third. Moreover, it should be recalled that the drafters of the GPECA sought to codify the existing court practice, which allowed extensive standing in relation to environmental matters while rejecting the idea of actio popularis. If the GPECA's §23 encompassed only the fi rst category of interests, it would probably not lead to a liberal approach to standing, while including all the categories would allow actio popularis.
According to the commentaries on the GPECA, *48 the understanding as to which 'well-being needs ' are worthy of protection changes over time and depends on the development of the relevant society and the means available to it. In principle, a person should be protected from environmental nuisances that do not Memorandum (see Note ), p. . Note that the earlier practice of the Circuit Court of Tallinn was focused on the issue of whether members of the public have standing in relation to a matter to do with construction in a 'green space' within a built-up area, such as a city park. See, for instance, Tallinn CCd, . . , --.
Planeerimisseadus (the Planning Act) was adopted on January . -RT I, . . , . Ehitusseadustik (the Building Code) was adopted on February . -RT I, . . , .
For instance, the Planning Act's § stipulates the principle of improving the living environment, which could be relevant in interpreting GPECA's section. However, the act and its explanatory memorandum (at pages) do not directly refer to GPECA's § . result in damage to health but are nonetheless disturbing even if the relevant limit values are not exceeded. Impairment in respect of a 'well-being need' may also consist in deprivation of something, such as light (due to the height of neighbouring buildings), water (as in the case of drying up of a well in consequence of mining activities), or access to green areas or the environment in general on the basis of 'everyman's right'. *49 The cautious position taken in the commentary allows interpreting the GPECA's §23 in terms of the fi rst category of interests: most of the examples consider issues that would be within the scope of traditional rights if the rights were interpreted broadly. In my view, the concept of 'health and well-being needs' should also include individuals' recreation-and aesthetics-related environmental interests. For instance, a birdwatcher, a hiker, a nature photographer, or a botanist studying particular plants should be able to rely on the right in principle.
The very limited court practice of application of the GPECA's §23 appears to indicate that the notion of 'health and well-being needs' is interpreted broadly. The Tallinn Circuit Court has taken the position that cutting down fi ve trees and building a car park in a yard may, in principle, aff ect the right of a city resident living in the house to which the yard belongs. *50 In another case, that court seemed to accept that using a rec reation area in a forest near a town is a health and well-being need of the residents of the town. *51
The criterion of signifi cant connection
The fi rst para grap h of the GPECA's §23 stipulates that a person has the relevant right only if he or she has a signifi cant connection with the aff ected environment. According to the second paragraph, a person has a signifi cant connection with the environment if that person often stays in the aff ected environment, often uses the aff ected natural resource, or otherwise has a special connection with the aff ected environment.
The provision is formulated on the basis of the earlier court practice. *52 In several decisions, the Tallinn Circuit Court has used the following formula: 'Environmental impact has personal scope, whether or not other basic rights are aff ected, if the relevant person has used the aff ected environmental resource habitually, if that person often stays in said environment, or if the person has a stronger connection with the environment than the rest of the public or the well-being of that person is otherwise signifi cantly aff ected by the environmental impact.' *53 In these cases, the court had to determine which members of the p ublic had standing in relation to an act that aff ected public green areas, such as a public city park. In the court's view, the living environment of a person includes at least the public space close to that person's home, especially parks and green areas, and also areas where the person habitually spends his or her leisure time. The formula was meant to allow broad standing but avoid actio popularis. In other words, when the concept of 'health and well-being needs' is interpreted broadly, many people may have an interest in the matter. The requirement of signifi cant connection should be understood as a fi lter for determination of which persons are more aff ected than others.
A person is more aff ected if using the environment often. The GPECA does not specify how frequent or intense the use must be. In any case, the person must prove that he or she uses the relevant environment frequently. In the pre-GPECA court practice, living close to the aff ected environment was considered suffi cient proof. *54 This seems to be the case also in the limited court practice of application of the GPECA's §23. *55 'Additionally, 'signifi cant connection' can be established on a basis other than use: any 'special connection' would be enough. The GPECA does not specify the meaning of 'special connection'. According to commentary on the act, it could consist of scientifi c interest, religious views, or ownership of the aff ected environment. *56
Ibid., pp.
-. The terms of this right are set out primarily in the GPECA's § § -and, in principle, allow every person to use private land and water. This includes use for certain economic activities, such as berry-picking. The wording of the GPECA's §23 raises the question of whether it is enough simply to prove the existence of a signifi cant connection without demonstrating impairment in relation to meeting a particular health and well-being need. In my opinion, the second element has to be demonstrated in principle but its existence can often be presumed. If a link to needs need not be made, individuals could eff ectively protect any interest, not merely personal interests. For example, if a person habitually walks in a park, his or her right may be aff ected if the walking paths are rendered inaccessible by building of a drainage system, whereas the right cannot be aff ected if the drainage system does not aff ect walking but destroys a habitat of a protected plant species. The eff ect on health and well-being needs also has to be taken into account in the decision on what constitutes a signifi cant connection. For instance, the more severe air pollution is, the less time a person has to stay in the aff ected area before being considered to have a signifi cant connection with the aff ected environment.
In summary, the criterion of signifi cant connection means that impairment of meeting of a need can be generally presumed if the person proves frequent use of the aff ected environment. In the event of doubt, a link must be established with a health and well-being need; however, there is no requirement set forth in the GPECA for demonstrating that the impairment is serious, obvious, etc.
The concept of affected environment
According to the second and third paragraph of the GPECA's §23, a person must have a signifi cant connection with an aff ected environment or one likely to be aff ected. The concept is related primarily to the causal relationship of an administrative act or measure with negative consequences. The wording is problematic for two reasons: it does not expressly provide ex ante protection, and it may be misleading with respect to the negative eff ects of the act or measure.
The causal relationships can be complicated in environmental matters. Disputes often revolve about the existence or extent of negative impacts that may result from an administrative act, such as granting of an environmental permit. The wording of the GPECA's §23 may give an impression that the right aff ords protection only if the environment has actually been aff ected and not in cases of potential negative impacts. However, the provision needs to be read in conjunction with other provisions of the GPECA, such as its statement of the precautionary principle ( §11), which stipulates that in environmental decision-making the impacts of the decisions have to be identifi ed and the risks have to be reduced to the maximum extent possible by means of appropriate precautionary measures.
The negative eff ects of an administrative act or measure also do not necessarily have to manifest themselves in changes to nature, but this fact is not clearly refl ected in the wording of the GPECA's §23. For example, the courts have had to rule on whether a restriction to the use of a recreational area in a forest may aff ect the right to an environment that meets health and well-being needs. Access to one such area was going to be restricted on as many as 90 days a year in order to ensure that nearby military exercises did not pose a threat to the public. The Tallinn Circuit Court was of the opinion that only actual extensive destruction of the forest could result in infringement of the right and that such destruction was very unlikely. *57 In my opinion, the court was misled by the wording of the GPECA's §23, which requires signifi cant connection with the aff ected environment. While the forest was not aff ected in the sense that it would be destroyed, the court did not consider that restrictions on the use of such a recreation area are similar to destruction of the forest in their consequence with regard to health and well-being needs: in both cases, the persons concerned cannot use the area for recreational purposes. It is my opinion that the right was aff ected and the court ought to have determined whether the restrictions to the use of the area were justifi ed.
The required quality of the environment
According to the fourth paragraph of the GPECA's §23, the rights of other persons, public interests, and the characteristics of the region are to be taken into account in assessment of how well the environment meets health and well-being needs. The non-compliance of the environment with health and well-being needs is presumed if a limit value set for the quality of the environment has been exceeded.
The wording of the paragraph is confusing: it is unclear whether it addresses the scope of the right or instead its limitations. One must assume that the fi rst sentence lists the general criteria to be taken into See the judgement referred to in Note , para. . account in limiting of the right, because the rights of other persons or public interest cannot directly determine the scope of another right.
The paragraph off ers very little guidance as to the contents of the right: the provision refers only to limit values for the quality of the environment. The defi nition of this term is provided in the third paragraph of the GPECA's §7: 'Limit value of the quality of the environment' means a limit value established for a chemical, physical, or biological indicator where, for the purpose of protecting human health and the environment, that value must not be exceeded. In other words, the quality of the environment is considered to be inadequate in the case of exceeding of a binding quality-limit value that is relevant for protection of meeting of a health or well-being need. We are unfortunate in that it is not necessarily obvious which indicators are limit values for the quality of the environment. Even if an indicator can be associated with health and well-being needs, it may not qualify because it is not strictly binding. Consider, for instance, the long-term objectives for ozone. There is no defi nitive date for achieving the objectives; what is stated in the Air Framework Directive is that if the long-term objectives are met, the Member States must, in principle, 'maintain those levels below the longterm objectives and shall preserve through proportionate measures the best ambient air quality compatible with sustainable development and a high level of environmental and human health protection'. *58 Also, while there are numerous limit values, many aspects of environmental quality are not covered by limit values and some elements of it cannot be regulated by way of limit values, such as odours or access to green areas.
The inadequacy of an environment that exceeds limit values is only presumed. It is not clear under what circumstances higher environmental quality has to be guaranteed or lower quality has to be accepted. It could be argued that the provision allows taking an individual person's special needs into account. For instance, if a small percentage of the human population is less tolerant of noise, it could be argued that the persons belonging to this segment of the population have a need for reduction in nightly noise. However, this does not seem to be supported by the wording of the name given to the right. Unlike Article 1 of the Århus Convention, the GPECA's §23 refers to an environment that is adequate not for meeting the needs of the rights-holder but for meeting of needs in general. This implies that the environment must meet the needs of an average person.
It is apparent from the relevant draft materials that the GPECA's §23 was not intended to be so ambiguous. According to the notes on the conception of the GPECA, the right was to be formulated in broad terms but integrated with the specifi c regulation in the special part of the code. *59 When the GPECA was adopted, in 2011, it was intended to enter into force at the same time as the special part (see §63). However, with the completion of the special part taking much longer than expected, a decision was taken in 2014 to bring the GPECA into force *60 before the next general election, in 2015. Consequently, the GPECA's §23 is not integrated with specifi c regulation in sector-specifi c environmental law, although such a link can be established in the future.
In my view, the vagueness of the GPECA's §23 does not necessarily mean that it is devoid of content and unenforceable beyond the terms on certain quality-limit values. Any legal provision that sets out a requirement related to the environment could be considered to defi ne an acceptable level for the environment. Consider the case of a building permit being issued for construction of a manure-storage facility within the water-protection zone. It could be argued that the provisions of the Water Act and the Nature Protection Act that clearly forbid such construction dictate that this is not an acceptable change in the environment. Any person who intensively uses the river for fi shing or recreational purposes could contest the permit on the basis that it violates his or her right to environment. In cases wherein a public authority has discretione.g., that of a decision on whether a building may be constructed in a green area of a city -it could be argued that the GPECA's §23 requires such decisions to take into account the potential uses of the environment by the public and balance them against other interests. If such consideration is not carried out, this omission could be grounds for annulling the decision. However, by dint of the ambiguity of the right and the principle of separation of powers, the courts should quash the decision only if the error in the application of discretion is evident. This was the approach taken by the Tallinn Circuit Court in its earlier practice. That court held that the basic right does not preclude changes in the environment. However, in making the relevant decisions, the public authority has to involve persons whose living environment is aff ected, must specify the motivation for the decision, and may allow adverse changes only for imperative reasons. *61
Remedies
A right that in theory is extensive has little practical value if its enforceability is limited. The fi fth paragraph of the GPECA's §23 stipulates that to uphold the right one can demand that the administrative authority preserve the environment and take reasonable measures to ensure that the environment is in line with the health and well-being needs. The provision clearly indicates that the right is meant to be enforceable. This is evident also from the fi rst paragraph of §30, which states that the violation of the right is subject to administrative review and administrative court review. The articulation of the right to demand preservation of the environment resembles the wording for the fundamental duty set out in §53 of the Constitution, which requires avoiding harmful action. *62 It is not fully clear whether the demand for preservation in the context of GPECA's §23 may include measures by public authorities to prevent or mitigate damage arising through actions of third parties. In general, the demand to take active measures, such as improvement of access to green areas, is limited to reasonable measures. The reference could be understood as dealing with the necessity of giving special consideration to the burden of action on the public authority and the eff ectiveness of the action in ensuring the right. *63 It refl ects the need for caution in requiring positive action in a situation in which it is unclear what quality of environment is acceptable in ensuring the right.
The GPECA's §23 does not allow directly contesting the actions of private persons, because demands may be addressed only to public authorities. *64 However, actions of public authorities often have immediate consequences for third parties -e.g., contesting the decision to issue an environmental permit aff ects the holder of the permit. Also, measures for improving the environment may entail obligations of private individuals. For instance, in order to reduce nightly noise in a neighbourhood, the local government may amend the regulations on night clubs or require actions from certain individual pub-owners. According to the commentary on the GPECA, the right of a public authority to demand actions by third parties cannot be based on the GPECA's §23 and has to be derived from other provisions. *65 Consequently the public authority may eff ectively be rendered unable to take measures that are considered reasonable for ensuring the right.
2.7. The Supreme Court's criteria for an environmental right and the GPECA's §23
According to the Supreme Court, an independent subjective environmental right can emerge when criteria for such an environment and everyone's obligation to tolerate environmental impacts can be fi xed in the law. Currently the legal criteria are manifestly inadequate for determining the extent to which the right may be protected. *66 The scope and contents of the GPECA's §23 are remarkably ambiguous and do not clarify the relevant legal criteria; i.e., the provision fails the test of the Supreme Court. A possible exception is to be found in certain quality-limit values that are designed for the protection of public health. It would be diffi cult to argue that with these values too the aim is not the protection of individual-level interests or that none of the values are suffi ciently detailed. However, the values are set out not in the GPECA but in specifi c environmental acts, which existed at the time of the decision of the Supreme Court. In my view, this probably means that the Supreme Court considers the values not to be encompassed by an independent right to environment but, rather, to be one aspect of the right to health protection, which is specifi ed in §28 of the Constitution. This right, as are other social and economic rights, is often viewed as amounting to little more than aspirational rhetoric. *67 The Estonian Supreme Court has rejected this view but has emphasised that judicial protection of the right to health protection is limited to the core of the right. The extent of the right depends, inter alia, on the economic capability of the state, and the judiciary shall not replace the legislative or executive powers in exercising of social policy. *68 So far, the focus of the court review by the Supreme Court has been on the right to health care and state assistance, not environmental aspects of the right. However, it is commonly held that the right includes underlying determinants for health, such as environmental conditions. *69 Also, the Supreme Court has been innovative in interpreting basic rights so as to accommodate environmental concerns, although this has met with resistance from more conservative judges. *70
Conclusions
The purpose with this article has been to examine the basis of the subjective right to environ ment set out in the GPECA's §23 and analyse its scope and contents to determine whether it satisfi es the criteria outlined by the Supreme Court for an independent subjective environmental right.
The conclusion is that the right has no explicit basis in international, EU, or constitutional law. However, some courts, especially the Circuit Court of Tallinn, have recognised a subjective basic right to environment. The GPECA's §23 was intended to codify and expand the existing court practice surrounding the basic environmental right. Court practice changed as the legislative proceedings progressed, but the Parliament did not alter the formulation of the provision.
The scope and contents of the right set out in the GPECA's §23 are noteworthy for their ambiguity. This is a consequence of the regrettable wording for some elements of the right, the Parliament's lack of initiative to discuss the extent of the right, and also the fact that the GPECA was initially designed to be not adopted ahead of the special part but integrated with it. Consequently, the GPECA's §23 fails the Supreme Court's test for an independent subjective environmental right, which requires fi xing the scope and content of the right in the law.
The GPECA's §23 relies on several undefi ned legal concepts. It is proposed that that term 'environment' encompasses the natural environment and elements of the built environment that are similar to the natural environment, such as city parks. The concept of 'health and well-being needs' should essentially encompass all individual-level environmental interests; otherwise, it cannot be distinguished from traditional rights or public interests. The criterion of 'signifi cant connection' should be understood as a fi lter for singling out persons whose abilities to meet their health and well-being needs are more aff ected. In general, it is sufficient to prove the existence of this 'signifi cant connection', but a link must be established with a health and well-being need when some doubt exists. The concept of 'aff ected environment' should not be understood as limiting the scope of the right to cases wherein an actual signifi cant physical change has occurred in the environment.
The only express guidance as to the contents of the right comes in the somewhat vague reference to exceeding of a quality-limit value. However, arguably any legal provision that sets out a requirement with regard to the environment could be considered to defi ne the level acceptable for the environment. Also, it could be argued that the GPECA's §23 requires a balancing-of-interests test in connection with any public environmental decision and that this use of discretion is, in principle, subject to court review. Depending on the viewpoint, one could consider the right therefore to be empty and unenforceable or, conversely, to allow enforcement of any environmental requirement that could aff ect the environment that the relevant person extensively uses. It remains to be seen how the Supreme Court will construe the GPECA's §23. -.
In a landmark decision, the court found that the right of land-ownership encompasses the interest in preserving a favourable status for the protected habitat of a plant species on the grounds that all plants are part of the immovable. The decision was not unanimous, as one of the justices considered such expansion of the right contrary to the nature of the right. ALCSCd . . , ----, para. ; dissenting opinion of I. Koolmeister, paras -.
